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Abstract 
Unlike other diversity-based approaches, N-variant sys-
tems thwart attacks without requiring secrets. Instead, 
they  use  redundancy  (to  require  an  attacker  to 
simultaneously compromise multiple variants with the 
same input) and tailored diversity (to make it impossi-
ble to compromise all the variants with the same input 
for given attack classes). In this work, we develop a 
method for using data diversity in N-variant systems to 
provide  high-assurance  arguments  against  a  class  of 
data corruption attacks. Data is transformed in the vari-
ants  so  identical  concrete  data  values  have  different 
interpretations.  In  order  to  corrupt  the  data  without 
detection,  an  attacker  would  need  to  alter  the 
corresponding data in each variant in a different way 
while  sending  the  same  inputs  to  all  variants.  We 
demonstrate our approach with a case study using that 
thwarts attacks that corrupt UID values. 
 
1.  Introduction 
Distributed computing relies upon networked services 
that are exposed to malicious adversaries. These adver-
saries, posing as legitimate clients, attack the services 
with which they interact, doing so by exploiting vulner-
abilities in the service software. Despite much effort, it 
has  proven  difficult  to  build  services  that  do  not 
contain security vulnerabilities.  
The  N-variant  systems  approach  makes  use  of 
redundancy,  using  an  architecture  that  combines 
tailored program diversity and execution monitoring to 
provide strong security guarantees that do not rely on 
assumptions  about  keeping  secrets.  The  transforma-
tions used to generate variants can be simple and the 
keys used to generate the variants can be openly pub-
lished. The N-variant architecture enables high-assur-
ance  arguments  to  be  made  with  respect  to  specific 
attack classes, regardless of the vulnerability exploited.  
A simple example is address space partitioning, in 
which a program P is replaced with two variants P0 and 
P1 (Figure 1). The variants are constructed to behave 
identically  to  P  on  normal  inputs,  but  use  disjoint 
memory regions: P0 uses addresses that start with a 0 
bit while addresses for P1 start with a 1 bit. All inputs 
are  replicated  and  sent  to  both  variants.  A  monitor 
observes both variants and reports an attack if their be-
haviors  diverge.  An  attack  that  involves  accessing  a 
specific absolute memory address (e.g., typical format 
string,  stack  and  heap  smashing,  and  return-to-libc 
attacks) may be constructed to succeed against either 
P0  or  P1,  but  if  that  same  input  is  run  on  the  other 
variant it is guaranteed produce a memory access error 
which will be detected by the monitor. Thus, an attack 
that relies on directly inserting an absolute address is 
impossible (assuming the framework replicates inputs 
correctly  and  the  monitor  observes  both  variants 
behavior with sufficient granularity) since the high bit 
cannot be 0 and 1 at the same time.  
Our earlier work introduced N-variant systems and 
demonstrated  address  space  partitioning  as  well  as 
another  instance  of  the  approach  for  defeating  code 
injection  by  tagging  instructions  in  different  variants 
with different values and checking and removing the 
tags  before  execution  [16].  Other  researchers  have 
developed other variations within similar frameworks: 
Bruschi  et  al.  created  a  variation  to  thwart  partial 
memory overwrites [9], and Franz created a variation 
using reverse stack ordering that provides probabilistic 
protection  against  certain relative memory corruption 
attacks  [20].  All  of  these  variations  alter  some  low-
level,  program-wide  property  such  as  the  format  of 
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  Figure 1. Two-variant address partitioning. instructions or the address space.  
Such  variations  are  promising  for  thwarting  large 
general attack classes, but provide only a glimpse of 
the opportunity N-variant frameworks provide, namely, 
the ability to deploy any diversity technique, including 
low-entropy  variations,  in  a  way  that  provides  high 
assurance security against a particular attack class.  
In  this  paper,  we  develop  a  general  method  for 
employing  data  diversity  in  N-variant  frameworks. 
Data diversity is a general approach to software fault 
tolerance  in which identical copies of a program are 
executed  with  different  data,  and  their  outputs  are 
subject to a vote [1]. The different versions of the data 
are  obtained  from  the  original  input  by  a  process 
known as reexpression, and the reexpression function 
is chosen so that either the results of the program are 
unaffected or the effects of reexpression on the outputs 
can be reversed easily. In traditional data diversity, the 
goal of reexpression is to avoid the regions of the input 
space for which the program fails. Since these regions 
are unknown in general, traditional data diversity offers 
only  probabilistic  guarantees  of  tolerating  software 
faults.  Our  work  is  focused  on  security  against  mal-
icious attacks, so instead of using a majority vote we 
interpret  any  divergence  in  behavior  as  a  security 
violation.  To  achieve  high  assurance  security 
properties,  our  goal  is  to  find  reexpression functions 
that are disjoint, so that any data corruption attack will 
be detected as a divergence. 
Unlike previous diversity techniques that are applied 
universally to a process’ address space, data diversity 
techniques  depend  on  understanding  the  underlying 
semantics of program data.  The data and program must 
be  transformed  in  a  way  that  preserves  the  original 
program  semantics  while  allowing  the  program  to 
operate  on  a  different  concrete  data  representation. 
Different data diversity techniques could be employed 
for different types of program data. As an example of 
our technique, we develop a variation that diversifies 
user  IDs  to  thwart  a  class of data corruption attacks 
where user identification data is corrupted to gain root 
privileges or masquerade as an arbitrary user.  
The  primary  contribution  of  this  paper  is  the 
development of a method for designing, implementing, 
and  reasoning  about  N-variant  systems  that  employ 
data  diversity.  Section  2  presents  a  model  for  data 
variation and explains how previous work on N-variant 
systems fits into our model. Section 3 demonstrates our 
approach  using  a  data  diversification  that  thwarts 
attacks  that  target  corrupting  UID  values.  Section  4 
reports  on  a  case  study  implementation  of  our  tech-
nique for the Apache web server. Section 5 discusses 
general lessons learned from our experience designing 
and  implementing  the  UID  variation.  We  present 
related work (which, surprisingly, extends to the 18
th 
century) in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.  
 
2.  Model 
In previous work, we reasoned about N-variant systems 
by considering the sequence of program states in each 
variant  [16].  Obtaining  the  desired  detection  and 
correctness  properties  required  establishing  two 
properties:  
1.  Normal  equivalence:  When  executing  on  normal 
(non-malicious) inputs, the variants remain in seman-
tically  equivalent  states.  To  establish  normal  equiva-
lence, a canonicalization function is used to map the 
states  of  all variants onto a canonical state. (For the 
address  partitioning  example,  the  canonicalization 
function maps the address spaces into the same space.) 
2.  Detection  –  when  executing  on  abnormal  (attack) 
inputs, the variants diverge in a way that is detectable 
by the monitor. Typically, this occurs when one of the 
variants  enters  an  alarm  state.  (For  the  address 
partitioning  example,  the  detection  property  occurs 
when  an  attack  injects  an  absolute  address,  which 
causes one of the variants to segmentation fault.) 
This model provides a general framework for reasoning 
about  N-variant  systems,  but  does  not  provide  much 
insight  for  designing  or  reasoning  about  how  to  use 
data diversity effectively. The difficulty is this model 
relies on reasoning about the entire program state.  
 
2.1 Interpreters Model 
To reason about data diversity variations, we prefer a 
model that allows us to reason more directly about how 
data  transformations  preserve  the  necessary  normal 
equivalence and detection properties. We consider an 
application  as  being  composed  of  a  series  of 
interpreters,  typically  organized  hierarchically.  Each 
interpreter  processes  a  particular  type  of  data.  For 
example, a web application depends on interpreters for 
handling  the  network  protocol,  the  HTTP  protocol, 
interpreting  scripts  that  implement  application  logic, 
executing database queries, accessing operating system 
services, and executing machine instructions. 
To carry out a successful attack an attacker needs to 
break through several layers of interpretation and con-
trol inputs to a specific target interpreter. For example, 
if  the  malicious  payload  consists  of  x86  machine 
instructions,  the  targeted  interpreter  is  the  machine 
hardware  itself.  If  the  attack  payload  opens  a  shell 
(e.g.,  by  executing  /bin/sh  on  Unix  systems),  then 
one  targeted  interpreter  might  be  the  filesystem.  A 
single exploit may target many different interpreters. The reason why an attacker is able to send malicious 
data to a targeted interpreter is that higher-level inter-
preters  contain  vulnerabilities.  Software  is  often 
deployed with many residual faults, some of which turn 
out to be severe security vulnerabilities.  
Figure  2  illustrates  an  N-variant  system  with  two 
variants using different interpreters for some data type, 
but  otherwise  implementing  the  same  program.  The 
attacker is constrained to use the same communication 
channel as regular user input (External Input), and will 
attempt to craft input that compromises the application. 
This external input, including its embedded malicious 
payload, will be interpreted by a series of interpreters 
in the application, abstracted in the figure by a single 
interpreter,  App  Interpreter.  By  exploiting  a  path 
through App Interpreter containing a vulnerability, the 
embedded malicious data reaches the target interpreter.  
In  general,  diversity  techniques  attempt  to  thwart 
attacks by changing the interfaces between interpreters. 
If an attacker does not know this interface, the attacker 
will  have  difficultly  guessing  an  input  that  has  the 
desired effect on the target interpreter.  
With  data  diversity,  the  variations  are  created  by 
using different data reexpression functions. If there is a 
large  space  of  possible  reexpression  functions  and 
associated secrets, it may be possible to provide a high 
degree  of  security  with  a  single  variant.  To  inject 
specific malicious data, the attacker needs to know the 
particular  inverse  reexpression  function  that  is  used. 
This configuration corresponds to the use of synthetic 
diversity techniques such as address space [8][42] and 
instruction set randomization for disrupting attacks [6] 
[25][28].  Security  arguments  for  such  techniques  are 
based on the claim that it is difficult for an attacker to 
guess  the  randomization  key.  In  practice,  keeping 
randomization  keys  secret  has  proven  difficult,  as 
demonstrated  by  attacks  on  address  space 
randomization  [37]  and  instruction  set  randomization 
[38] techniques that exploit the limited actual entropy 
available for randomizations and probing opportunities.  
The  N-variant  framework  obviates  the  need  for 
secrets  and  high  entropy.  The  reexpression  functions 
are designed so that any concrete data that is valid for 
one  variant  is  invalid  for  the  other.  The  target 
interpreters are not designed to attempt to distinguish 
between  malicious  and  normal  data  directly.  Instead, 
they rely on the fact that the same malicious data will 
be  sent  to  both  target  interpreters,  whereas  normal 
application data will have been reexpressed.  
As shown in Figure 2, each variant has a different 
reexpression function (R0, R1), and hence will operate 
on  different  data.  Trusted  data  embedded  in  P  is 
transformed using these functions in the corresponding 
variants.  To  preserve  program  semantics,  the  target 
interpreters are preceded by the corresponding inverse 
reexpression functions, R
-1
0 and R
-1
1. This establishes a 
different  data  interpretation  between  the  application 
and target interpreters. 
 
2.2 Normal Equivalence 
Consider a data variation for a target type T and a given 
program  P.  To  establish  the  normal  equivalence 
property for each variant Pi we need to show:                                   
(1)  All trusted data of type T used by P is trans-
formed using the reexpression function Ri. 
(2)  All instructions in Pi that operate on T values 
directly (that is, without sending them to the 
target interpreter) are transformed to preserve 
the  original  semantics  when  operating  on 
reexpressed data. 
In addition, we need to show the reexpression function 
and its inverse are indeed inverses: 
(3)  ∀x: T, R
-1
i(Ri(T)) ≡ T. (inverse property) 
 
Showing the necessary inverse property holds is usually 
straightforward  since  the  reexpression  function  is 
designed to have this property. 
Establishing  the  first  two  properties  requires 
reasoning about a program transformation (and possib-
ly also about transformation of other external data as 
seen  in  Section  3.4).  Transforming  trusted  program 
data requires identifying the constant data of the target 
type in P, and applying Ri to it to produce Pi. If the 
target data type is well defined, this should be fairly 
straightforward.  Preserving  the  semantics  is  a  more 
challenging  problem.  At  worst,  the  inverse  reex-
pression function can be embedded in the program to 
preserve the semantics of the original code.  
2.3 Detection 
The  detection  property  states  that  if  one  variant  is 
 
Figure 2. N-Variant Systems with Data Diversity. compromised, the other must be in a state that indicates 
an attack. This requires that any injected data of the 
target type will be detected when the target interpreters 
compare their input data. This is achieved if the inverse 
reexpression functions are disjoint:  
∀x: R
-1
0(x) ≠ R
-1
1 (x) (disjointedness property).  
Hence,  any  time  an  identical  value  is  sent  to  both 
interpreters an alarm is raised, since the inverted values 
must be different. 
Detection is only guaranteed by this property if all 
transformations  that  the  application  interpreter 
performs on input data are identical in the two variants. 
Otherwise, an attacker may be able to craft an input Z 
that is transformed by P0 into Z′ and P1 into Z′′ (where 
Z′ ≠ Z′′) before it is sent to the target interpreter.  
The detection property also requires that an attack 
must inject complete values of the targeted type. For 
example, address space partitioning provides protection 
only against attacks that inject complete addresses. It is 
vulnerable to an attack that can corrupt just the three 
low-order bytes of an address, leaving the high-order 
byte unchanged. The extended version of address space 
partitioning  is  (probabilistically)  resilient  to  a  byte-
overwriting attack since the low order bytes will also 
differ between variants.  
 
2.4 Examples 
Table 1 summarizes four variations using our model. 
The first three variations were developed in previous 
papers;  we  introduce  the fourth variation in the next 
section. For the previous variations, the target type is 
broad:  for  the  first  two,  it  is  all  addresses,  and  for 
instruction  set  tagging  it  is  all  instructions.  Hence, 
creating  the  variations  to  satisfy  the  needed  normal 
equivalence  property  is  fairly  straightforward  and 
requires no analysis of the program. 
 
3.  UID Data Variation 
We  now  examine  a  data  diversification  designed  to 
thwart attacks that corrupt user ID data. This is a type 
of non-control data attack as described by Chen et al. in 
which an attacker corrupts a data value that causes the 
original program to execute maliciously [12].  
We  focus  on  the  corruption  of  user  and  group 
identification data (UID/GID), although data diversity 
techniques  could  be  designed  to  provide  protection 
against other data attacks. In the rest of the paper, we 
use the term UID to denote both UID and GID values.  
To test the idea of data variation, we implemented a 
UID variation on the Apache web server [2]. A com-
mon pattern for servers is to drop their privileges when 
handling  client  requests.  However,  there  will  be 
instances when accessing critical system resources that 
require the escalation of privileges to the root account. 
If an attacker can corrupt the UID value used to drop or 
escalate privileges, then the attacker can masquerade as 
root  (or  any  other  user)  in  the  system.  Chen  et  al. 
describe one example of such an attack [12]. 
 
3.1 N-Variant Framework 
Before describing our variation strategy and its imple-
mentation, we review the existing N-variant framework 
prototype [16]. Our implementation is a Linux kernel 
modified  to  execute  the  variants  using  system  call 
boundaries  for  both  synchronization  and  monitoring 
purposes. To run a program as an N-variant system, the 
variant executables are created. Then, a script is used 
to  launch  the  N-variant  system  with  the  selected 
variants, e.g., nvexec prog1 prog2.  
We updated kernel data structures to keep track of 
variant  processes  and  implemented  wrappers  around 
system calls. System calls are used as synchronization 
points: once one variant makes a system call, it will not 
proceed until all other variants make the same system 
call. We wrap input system calls so that the actual input 
operation is only performed once and the same data is 
sent to all variants.  
This  removes  most  sources  of  non-determinism 
since each variant receives the same result for system 
calls. However, our implementation does not yet handle 
issues  involving  scheduling  divergences  that  can  be 
caused by signals and threading [16]. For example, if a 
Variation  Target Type  Reexpression Functions  Inverse Functions 
Address Space 
Partitioning [16]  Address  R0(a) = a 
R1(a) = a + 0x80000000 
R
-1
0(a) = a 
R
-1
1(a) = a – 0x80000000 
Extended Address Space  
Partitioning [9]  Address  R0(a) = a 
R1(a) = a + 0x80000000 + offset 
R
-1
0(a) = a 
R
-1
1(a) = a – 0x80000000 – offset 
Instruction Set  
Tagging [16]  Instruction  R0(inst)= 0 || inst 
R1(inst)= 1 || inst 
R
-1
0(0 || inst) = inst 
R
-1
1(1 || inst) = inst  
UID Variation (this paper)  UID 
R0(u)= u 
R1(u)= u ⊕ 0x7FFFFFFF 
R
-1
0(u)= u 
R
-1
1(u)= u ⊕ 0x7FFFFFFF 
Table 1. Reexpression Functions. signal is delivered to variants at different points in their 
execution, their behaviors may diverge. This leads to a 
false attack detection. Bruschi et. al. have developed a 
different implementation of a similar redundant execu-
tion  framework  that  provides  some  steps  towards 
simultaneous signal delivery [9].  
The  wrappers  also  act  as  monitors  and  check  for 
divergent behavior by making sure that all system calls 
receive equivalent arguments before allowing the actual 
system call to proceed.  For output related system calls, 
we also check that the variants are making equivalent 
system calls, and issue the actual call only once.  
 
3.2 Reexpression Functions 
To defend against this attack class, we adopted a reex-
pression function that is resilient to partial data value 
corruptions.  For P0, the reexpression function (and its 
inverse) is the identity function.  Hence, UID = 0 corre-
sponds to root as normal. For P1, we use:  
R1(u) = u ⊕ 0x7FFFFFFF   
R
-1
1(u) = u ⊕ 0x7FFFFFFF 
Hence, 0x7FFFFFFF represents root. The reexpression 
functions satisfy both the inverse property (the XORs 
cancel  out)  and  the  disjointedness  property  (flipping 
bits always changes the value).  
This reexpression function is susceptible to a high 
bit overwrite, since the high bit is not flipped. Ideally 
we would have used a reexpression function that flips 
all  bits  in  the  data  value  (XOR  with  0xFFFFFFFF). 
This  causes  some  implementation  difficulties.  
Although the UID datatype is normally unsigned.  The 
kernel internally treats negative UID values as special 
cases  so  flipping  the  high  bit  (sign)  would  cause  
difficulties.  
Although  individual  bit  attacks  are  certainly 
possible  in  theory,  the  lowest  level  of  granularity 
reported for partial memory overwriting attacks under a 
remote attacker threat model is at the byte-level so we 
do not consider this a likely threat. While bit flips have 
been  reported  for  other  threat  models,  e.g.,  the  heat 
lamp attack on the Java virtual machine [3], no known 
realistic attack allows an attacker to reliably target a 
specific bit to flip. 
 
3.3 Applying Reexpression Functions 
To create the variants we must transform the program 
to  incorporate  our  reexpression  function.  Since  the 
reexpression function for P0 is the identity function, the 
original program can be used unchanged for the first 
variant.  To  create  the  second  variant,  we  perform  a 
source-to-source program transformation. For our case 
study, the transformation was done manually, but in a 
way that could be readily automated (as discussed in 
Section  5).  To  apply  the  transformations,  our 
transformer must be able to determine which values in 
a program are UID values. For a well-typed C program, 
all  values  used  as  UIDs  are  typed  uid_t,  and  the 
uid_t type is never used to hold non-UID values.  
For the second variant, we need to establish the first 
two  properties  required  for  normal  equivalence  from 
Section 2.2: (1) all UID values in P1 must be trans-
formed  using  R1;  and  (2)  all  instructions  in  P1  that 
operate directly on UID values must be transformed to 
preserve the original semantics when operating on re-
expressed values. 
For the first property, we identify all UID constants 
using the C data type, and replace these values with the 
result  of  applying  R1  to  them.  In  some  situations, 
constants are used implicitly.  For example, an if state-
ment  such  as  if(!getuid())  contains  an  implied 
comparison to the constant 0. The statement is replaced 
with  if(getuid()==0).  This  is  to  have  the  UID 
constant  explicitly  stated,  after  which  the  constant 
value is transformed.  
The second property requires modifying code that 
manipulates UID values. We assume that only assign-
ment  and  comparison  operations  are  applied  to  UID 
values.  Programs  do  not  typically  perform  other 
operations on UID values, but if a program uses other 
operations  on  UID  values  additional  transformations 
would be needed. Handling assignments and equality 
comparisons requires no code changes; if the operation 
involves a constant value, it was already transformed 
by  the  data  transformation.  Inequality  comparisons 
must  be  logically  reversed,  however,  to  preserve  the 
original  semantics  on  transformed  values  (where  all 
bits except the high bit have been flipped).  
 
3.4 Support for External Data 
Our data variation requires that all trusted data used by 
the variants is transformed using the reexpression func-
tion.  Otherwise,  untransformed  data  will  have  the 
wrong representation when it reaches the target inter-
preter.  The  transformations  in  the  previous  section 
transform data in the program itself, but many servers 
also rely on external data such as configuration files for 
their proper operations. For example, Apache uses UID 
values in the /etc/passwd and /etc/group files.  
We thus needed to develop a mechanism for the two 
variants to receive varied data originating from trusted 
external sources. One approach would be to apply the 
reexpression  functions  as  data  is  read  from  external 
sources. This seems risky, however, since an attacker 
may be able to corrupt data by using this same path.   
The alternative is to provide two versions of the trusted files and extend the framework to support file variants 
for  the  program  variants.  This  approach  is  more 
general, and opens other interesting possibilities based 
on diversity of data in configuration files. 
To enable this, we created the notion of unshared 
files. Previously, all files were shared since all variants 
operated on identical data. I/O system calls were per-
formed once and the result was passed to all variants. 
Now,  when  the  variants  make  a  request  to  open  an 
unshared file, the kernel opens a different file for each 
variant that contains data specific to that variant. For 
example,  when  both  variants  request  that 
/etc/passwd  be  opened,  P0  will  actually  open 
/etc/passwd-0 and P1 will open /etc/passwd-1. 
The diversified password files are identical except the 
UID  values  are  transformed  using  the  appropriate 
reexpression function. When the variants then perform 
an operation such as a read on an unshared file, each 
will do it on its separate file, while shared files will 
behave the same as before, having one variant perform 
the system call and giving all variants the same result. 
We modified the kernel so that each variant keeps 
its  own  file  table  data  structure  where  information 
about the processes’ open files resides. We keep this 
data-structure  synchronized  between  the  variants  so 
that the n
th slot in P0’s data structure corresponds to the 
n
th slot in P1’s data structure. When a file is opened, the 
kernel creates an entry for that file in each variants’ file 
table.  If  the  file  being  opened  is  shared  (the  normal 
case), the kernel marks the bit in the shared files data-
structure to indicate it, otherwise it will clear that bit. 
When subsequent system calls are made that use a file 
descriptor, the kernel accesses the shared files bitmap 
and  determine  if  the  files  are  shared  or  unshared.  If 
they  are  shared,  the kernel will have P0 perform the 
system call and give the result to all variants. If the file 
is unshared, each variant will perform the system call 
reading  or  writing  data  to  their  own  diversified  file. 
When the files are closed the kernel will clear the entry 
in all variants’ file tables. 
 
3.5 System Calls 
The kernel calls that take UID parameters are the target 
interface for the data variation. Hence, the implementa-
tions of these calls should incorporate the inverse data 
transformation. We also use the system calls to check 
that  the  variants  have  not  diverged.  They  should 
operate identically on the same data (after it has been 
transformed using the appropriate inverse reexpression 
function). 
We modified the wrappers of all system calls that 
involve  UID  parameters.  For  calls  that  take  UID 
parameters  such  as  long  setuid(uid_t),  the 
wrapper  applies  the  inverse  reexpression  function.  It 
also checks that the same actual (post-inverse transfor-
mation) values are passed into the call by all variants. 
For the system calls that return a UID value such as 
uid_t  getuid(),  the  wrapper  applies  the  re-ex-
pression transformation on the result (which is trusted), 
giving each variant its own varied UID value.  
We  are also concerned with attacks where a UID 
value is corrupted in a way that leads to other behaviors 
before  one  of  the  system  calls  involves  a  UID 
parameter directly. Ideally, the monitor would observe 
and  check  the  variants  to  be  in  normally  equivalent 
states after each transition. This is impractical, so our 
current implementation approximates this by observing 
the system call made by the variants and ensures that 
they are equivalent. To ensure detection, we transform 
the program to expose UID uses to the monitor with 
newly  created  system  calls.  This  ensures  that  the 
monitor observes any UID divergence before the cor-
rupted UID value is used.  
Table 2 summarizes the newly created system calls. 
The  uid_value(uid_t)  function  passes  the  UID 
value to the kernel which compares the values across 
the variants and ensures they have equivalent meanings 
(i.e., they are identical after applying the appropriate 
inverse  reexpression  functions).  The  function  returns 
the same value that was passed in. An example where 
this is used is in getpwname(uid_t): 
pw = getpwname(uid); 
  becomes 
pw = getpwname(uid_value uid_value uid_value uid_value(uid)); 
The  cond_chk(bool)  function  checks  a  condition 
code,  which  UID  values  may  directly  or  indirectly 
affect.  It  is  passed  in  the  result  of  a  conditional 
expression and ensures that both variants take the same 
path. For example, (pw == NULL) would  be  replaced 
by (cond_chk cond_chk cond_chk cond_chk(pw == NULL)). 
Function Signature  Description 
uid_t uid_value(uid_t)  Compares parameter 
value (across 
variants) and returns 
passed value. 
bool cond_chk(bool)  Checks conditional 
value given between 
variants is the same.  
bool cc_eq(uid_t, uid_t) 
bool cc_neq(uid_t, uid_t) 
bool cc_lt(uid_t, uid_t) 
bool cc_leq(uid_t, uid_t) 
bool cc_gt(uid_t, uid_t) 
bool cc_geq(uid_t, uid_t) 
Compares 
parameters and 
returns the truth 
value for 
comparison. 
Table 2. Detection System Calls. The  other  system  calls  are  used  when  directly 
comparing  two  UID  values  (=,  ≠,  <.  ≤,  >,  ≥).  They 
could  be  written  using  the  cond_chk  call,  but 
providing these additional calls offers two advantages: 
(1)  it  reduces  the  number  of  system  calls  needed  to 
perform the check since both UID values are checked 
with one system call, and (2) the variants’ instruction 
streams remain identical, while if the comparison were 
done in user space, P1’s operators would need to get 
switched (≤ becomes ≥) due to the data variation. For 
example, (uid == VARIANT_ROOT) is replaced by  
(cc_eq cc_eq cc_eq cc_eq(uid, VARIANT_ROOT)). 
 
4.  Apache Case Study 
To evaluate our variation, we conducted a case study 
on the Apache web server. To create Apache variants 
we needed to make a total of 73 changes to the source 
code.  Fifteen  of  the  changes  involved  applying  the 
reexpression  function  to  constant  UID  values  in  the 
source code. We needed 16 changes to introduce the 
new system calls to expose single UID value usages to 
the  monitor,  22  changes  to  expose  conditional  state-
ments that compared UID values, and 20 changes to 
check conditional statements. 
Constructing variants by hand is tedious and error 
prone.  Without  any  automation,  this  variation  would 
not likely be practical. There are two main parts of this 
transformation.  First,  identifying  the  variables  that 
contain UID values. If the programmer uses the uid_t 
and  gid_t  data  types  strictly,  then  it  would  only 
require  identifying  which  constant  values  were 
assigned or compared to those variables and changing 
them according to the variation. If the programmer did 
not use uid_t data type to declare the variables, they 
could  be  inferred  using  dataflow  analysis  by  seeing 
which variables stored the result of functions returning 
a known uid value (e.g., getuid) or were passed as a 
parameter  to  a  function  expecting  a  user  id  (e.g., 
setuid). Several static analysis tools, including Splint 
[31], are available that already do this analysis. Using 
this simple analysis technique would have identified all 
instances of UIDs in the Apache Web Server. 
Once  all  the  UID  values  were  identified  and 
changed  accordingly,  we  exposed  the  uses  of  UID 
variables  to  the  monitor  using  the  newly  developed 
system calls (Table 2). 
Apache only had one complicating factor. If Apache 
encountered an error related to the UID, it would write 
an  error  message  including  the  UID  to  a  log  file. If 
these output statements were left unmodified, it would 
result  in  a  divergence  since  the  UID  values  are 
different.  However,  modifying  the  statements  so  P1 
converts the UID value would open a potential security 
vulnerability. We worked around this problem simply 
by removing the user id value from the log output. 
Table  3  summarizes  our  performance  results.  We 
measured  the  throughput  and  latency  of  our  system 
using WebBench 5.0 [41], a web server benchmark that 
serves a variety of static web page requests. We ran 
two sets of experiments measuring the performance of 
our Apache server under unsaturated and saturated load 
conditions. For the first set of experiments, we used a 
single  client  machine  running  one  WebBench  client 
engine.  For  the  load  experiments,  we  saturated  our 
server  using  3  clients  each  running  five  WebBench 
clients connected to the same networks switch as the 
server. In both sets, a single 1.4 GHz Pentium 4 server 
machine with 384 MB RAM ran Fedora Core 5 (2.6.16 
kernel) using 4 different configurations.   
Configuration  1  is  the  baseline  configuration:  un-
modified apache running on our kernel. Note that in 
general  an  unmodified  program  running  under  our 
modified  kernel  incurs  practically  no  overhead.  The 
only overhead would be the addition of an extra check 
(an if statement to determine if a process is participa-
ting in N-variant system) per system call.  
Configuration  2  shows  the  overhead  of  the  UID 
code transformations made to Apache. In our experi-
ments, it was negligible; this is unsurprising since most 
of the UID operations are done when the server initial-
izes.  The  additional  overhead  is  one  system  call  per 
request to compare two UID values.  
Configuration 3 is a 2-variant system where the two 
variants  differ  in  the  address  spaces  with  the  kernel 
configured  to  support  unshared  files. This configura-
tion provides a baseline case when running two variants 
and  can  be  used  to  measure  the  overhead  of  any 
Configuration  1  2  3  4 
Description  Unmodified 
Apache 
Transformed 
Apache 
2-Variant 
Address Space  
2-Variant 
UID 
Throughput (KB/s)  1010  973  887  877  Unsaturated 
Latency (ms)  5.81  5.81  6.56  6.65 
Throughput (KB/s)  5420  5372  2369  2262 
Saturated 
Latency (ms)  16.32  16.24  37.36  38.49 
Table 3. Performance Results. additional  variations.  For  the  unloaded  server,  this 
resulted  in  a  throughput  decrease  of  12.2%  and  a 
latency  increase  of  12.9%  from  the  baseline 
configuration.  For  the  loaded  server,  throughput 
decreases by 56% while latency increases by 129%.  
Since the N-variant system executes all computation 
twice, but all I/O system calls only once, the overhead 
incurred reflects the cost of duplicating computation, as 
well  as  the  checking  done  by  the  wrappers.  The 
overhead  measured  for  the  unloaded  server  is  fairly 
low, since the process is primarily I/O bound. For the 
loaded  server,  the  process  becomes  more  compute-
bound,  and  the  approximate  halving  of  throughput 
reflects  the  redundant  computation  required  from 
running 2 variants. 
Configuration  4  is  a  2-variant  system  running  the 
UID  variation  described  in  Section  4.  We  present 
overhead  relative  to  Configuration  3  to  measure  the 
added  overhead  of  our  variation.  For  the  unloaded 
server,  throughput  decreased  by  1%,  while  latency 
increased by 1.4%. For the loaded server, throughput 
decreased by 4.5%, while latency increased by 3%.  
These results are encouraging in that although the 
overall  overhead  is  high  because  of  the  redundant 
computation, additional variations may be performed at 
relatively  low  cost.  This  opens  up  the  practical 
possibility of combining variations to achieve broader 
coverage  of  attack  classes.  However,  variation 
composition  must  be  done  carefully  to  ensure  that 
variations still satisfy the required normal equivalence 
properties when they are composed [16]. 
In general, our results indicate that for I/O bound 
services, N-variant systems with the UID variation can 
be  done  with  performance  overhead  that  would  be 
acceptable  for  many  deployments.  For  CPU-bound 
services, the overhead of our approach is high since all 
computations  need  to  be  performed  twice.  Multi-
processors may alleviate some of the problem (in cases 
where  there  is  not  enough  load  to  keep  the  other 
processors busy normally) [20].  
 
5.  Discussion 
Designing data variations for non-control data attacks 
is more difficult than we had anticipated. In particular, 
applications  such  as  Apache  rely on external config-
uration files such as /etc/passwd and /etc/group 
to  map  user  names  to  UIDs.  We  wanted  to  avoid 
embedding  the  reexpression  functions  directly  inside 
the web server itself since this would have opened up a 
potential  path  by  which  an  attacker  could  bypass 
detection  by  reusing  the  reexpression  functions.  Our 
solution  was  to  provide  support  for  the  concept  of 
unshared  files,  in  which  the  variants  read  from  their 
respective reexpressed files (e.g., /etc/passwd-0 for 
variant 0 and /etc/passwd-1 for variant 1). Although 
we  have  not  yet  explored  other  applications  of  un-
shared files, they provide other exciting opportunities 
for diversity. For example, web server variants could 
be run with different directory structures and different 
configuration files to thwart attacks on file paths.  
For  detection,  we  defined  new  system  calls  to 
synchronize and check for the validity of UID values at 
the point of use. This design choice was motivated by 
our desire to make strong arguments regarding (nearly) 
immediate detection of corrupted UID values. Another 
possibility is to rely on the already existing monitoring 
mechanism  for  checking  divergence  at  system  call 
boundaries at the cost of detection precision. From our 
performance  results,  the  costs  of  these  extra  system 
calls appear to be minor. 
Varying  UIDs  as  a  reexpression  strategy  required 
making  strong  assumption  about  their  uses  being 
limited to assignments and comparisons. This assump-
tion turns out to be warranted for a simple data type 
like  UIDs,  but  UIDs  are  only  one  type  of  security 
critical  data  identified  by  Chen et al. [12]. Our next 
step is to investigate data variations for other types of 
security-critical  data  such  as  configuration  data  and 
decision-making data. In the general case, data opera-
tions can be much more complex, e.g., functions that 
manipulate strings such as regular expression matchers. 
More  complex  data  types  pose  more  challenges  in 
diversification  while  preserving  semantics,  but  also 
opportunities  to  thwart  larger  attack  classes.  If  data 
types  are  properly  encapsulated,  perhaps  via  C++ 
classes,  we  could  safely  maintain  program  semantics 
while varying data representations provided the class 
interface did not leak internal implementation details.  
 
6.  Related Work 
The first use of data diversity of which we are aware 
was  by  British  Astronomer  Royal,  Nevil  Maskelyne, 
who employed data diversity techniques using human 
computers  to  improve  the  reliability  of  astronomical 
tables  published  in  the  1767  Nautical  Almanac 
[17][23]. For the lunar tables, Maskelyne would assign 
one  (human)  computer  the  task  of  calculating  the 
moon’s position at noon for each day of the month, and 
another computer (known as the anticomputer) the task 
of calculating the moon’s position at midnight. A third 
person  known  as  a  comparer  was  responsible  for 
merging and checking the computers’ results.  
We discussed the most closely related recent work 
on  N-variant  systems  in  the  introduction.  Next,  we 
consider  other  defenses  suggested  by  the  interpreter 
model, and other work on redundant execution. Other Defenses. An orthogonal strategy is to eliminate 
vulnerabilities altogether so that malicious data cannot 
reach the target interpreter. An example of this strategy 
is  to  use  type-safe  languages  to  eliminate  memory 
vulnerabilities or using point defenses against specific 
vulnerabilities [14][18][36]. Another strategy is to seek 
ways  to  distinguish  trusted  and  untrusted  data.  An 
example would be taint analysis techniques to track the 
flow of information from untrusted sources and prevent 
their use in security-critical functions [24][33][34][43].  
Diversity Techniques. Numerous diversity techniques 
have  been  proposed  for  increasing  the  difficulty  of 
exploiting  vulnerabilities,  including  randomizing  in-
structions  [6][28],  memory  layout  [8][42],  compiler 
layout [1][19], encrypting pointers [15][40], and opera-
ting  system  interface  [13].  Unlike  the  N-variant 
systems approach, all of these works rely on attackers’ 
inability to guess a secret key for security. 
Redundant  Computation.  N-version  programming 
[4][11][26]  (from  which  we  adopted  the  name  N-
variant  systems)  uses  multiple  independent  teams  to 
produce the software intended to implement the same 
requirements.  It is based on design diversity, in the 
hope  of  avoiding  common  faults  between  versions. 
However,  Knight  and  Leveson  have  shown  experi-
mentally that even separate teams are likely to make 
similar  mistakes  [29].  Furthermore,  N-version  pro-
gramming  is  resource-intensive,  and  thus  typically 
applied  to  critical  systems  only.  Littlewood  et.  al 
present a recent overview of design and data diversity, 
and their application to security [32].  
For popular servers, such as web servers, multiple 
implementations  of  the  same  protocol  may  be  avail-
able. The HACQIT project [27][35] deployed two web 
servers  (IIS  running  on  Windows  and  Apache  on 
Linux)  and  checked  HTTP  status  code  to  indicate 
divergence.  Totel,  Majorczyk  and  Mé  extended  this 
idea and compared the actual web page responses of 
the servers [39]. The challenge in this approach is to 
distinguish  benign  differences  in  the  output  arising 
because  of  design  difference  in  the  servers  or  host 
specific  properties,  from  differences  that  indicate  an 
attack.  Gao,  Reiter  and  Song  correlate  system  calls 
between  web  servers  to  identify  attacks  [21][22].  Of 
these, the first two approaches would not have detected 
a UID exploit provided the attack did not perturb the 
output web pages. Gao et al.’s system may potentially 
detect such an attack if it results in sufficiently non-
correlated system calls. In contrast, using our approach 
we  can  make  strong  guarantees  about  detecting  all 
attacks in a particular attack class. 
Berger  and  Zorn  proposed  a  redundant  execution 
framework with multiple replicas each with a different 
randomized  layout  of  objects  within  the  heap  to 
provide  probabilistic  memory  safety  [7].  Their  repli-
cation framework only handles processes whose I/O is 
through standard in/out, and only a limited number of 
system calls are caught to ensure all replicas see the 
same  values.  Their  goals  were  to  enhance  reliability 
and availability, rather than to detect and resist attacks. 
An  extension  would  be  to  combine  the  fine-grained 
monitoring  capabilities  of  N-variant  systems  with 
probabilistic variations such as theirs.  
  
7.  Conclusion 
The N-variant systems approach to security holds the 
promise for building systems whose security properties 
with respect to particular attack classes can be assured 
with  high  confidence.  Furthermore,  these  properties 
can be achieved without relying on secrets, and using 
low-entropy transformations.  
In this paper, we developed a general approach to 
data diversity for N-variant systems and demonstrated 
this  approach  with  a  data  variation  for  combating 
attacks  that  involve  corruption  of  UID  values. 
Although  this  particular  problem  can  be  more  easily 
combated  in  other  ways,  the  approach  described  is 
promising  in  demonstrating  how  low-entropy  data 
diversity can be used to provide high assurance security 
against particular attack classes. In future work we plan 
to investigate the addition and composition of further 
data diversity techniques. 
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